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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 
16668 
ALFRED WILLIAM JOHNSON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with and convicted of burglary, 
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-202 (1953, as amended). 
DISPOSITIOtl IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant, Alfred William Johnson, was tried before 
a jury in the Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable 
James S. Sawaya, Judge, presiding. The jury returned a verdict 
of guilty. The court sentenced the appellant to serve the 
indeterminate term as provided by law of not less than one 
nor more than fifteen years at the Utah State Prison. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the verdict of 
guilty rendered by the jury below. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At trial the victim, Richard Ball, testified 
that on return to his apartment, located at Snowbird Ski 
Resort, Salt Lake County, he found the appellant inside 
(T .11) . Mr. Ball testified that all doors to his apartment 
were locked when he left at 10: 10 a.m. and that he was the 
only person with a key (T.17,18). He noted that a screen 
which was intact when he left two hours earlier now had 
a "L" shaped cut in it (T.12,17). 
The victim noticed that a security box which h~ 
a hidden 1ock had been moved from its normal resting place 
at the head of the bed to the center of the bed (T.11,18). 
The hidden lock, which was exposable onlv bv slidin~ a 
oiece on the bottom of the box was now exposed (T.19). 
Mr. Ball asked the appellant what he was dbing in his ro~ 
and was told that he was "looking for a way out" (T.12,25). 
When Mr. Ball continued to question the appellant he was tole 
that the appellant was a guest who was staying upstairs 
(T.12,13). Mr. Ball called the front desk to verify the 
appellant's story. Meanwhile the appellant made his way to 
the door and then left Richard Ball's apartment (T.13 ,2 6) · 
· iona Mr. Ball followed the appellant who broke into a J09 a ~ 
-2-
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a narrow foot path and a full fledged run when he reached 
the parking lot (T.14). 
Richard Ball was able to take down the appellant's 
license plate number which he reported to Snowbird 
security (T.15). 
The appellant was apprehended by Officer Chard 
at 1250 East on 6800 South (T.37), and later was positively 
identified by Richard Ball (T.16). 
During cross-examination of arresting officer 
Chard, appellant's counsel attempted to elicit a statement 
made by the appellant (T.39). The prosecution objected 
on the ground that the statement would be hearsay and the 
trial court sustained the objection (T.39). When appellant's 
counsel contested the ruling of the judge the jury was 
dismissed and the issue was argued (T.40-45). At that time 
appellant's counsel directed the court solely to Rule 63(6) 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence (T.40). The trial court 
rejected the appellant's construction of Rule 63(6) and 
ruled that the appellant's statement was self-serving and 
not admissible as a confession or admission (T.45). 
The appellant requested that an instruction on 
the lesser offense of criminal trespass be given. The 
trial court refused and the appellant took exception (T.75) • 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT IS PRECLUDED FROM RAISING 
ANY EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE WHICH 
WAS NOT TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW. 
The appellant contends that the trial court erred 
in excluding his hearsay statement because it falls under at 
least one of five exceptions to the hearsay rule (Appellant's 
brief at p. 4). This general contention should fail because 
the only exception which is properly before this Court on 
appeal is Rule 63(6) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which 
was timely raised by the appellant at trial as the sole 
basis for admitting the hearsay statement of the appellant. 
The transcript reveals that the appellant's attorney 
attempted to solicit a hearsay statement from the arresting 
police officer. The prosecution objected to introduction 
of the conversation on the grounds that it was hearsay, a~ 
the court sustained the objection (T.39). 
The appellant contested the court's ruling and 
the issue was discussed out of the presence of the jury 
(T.40). The appellant directed the court to Rule 63(6) 
as the exception which justified admission of the appellant's 
hearsay statement (T.40). 
Appellant is now raising for the first time on 
-4-
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appeal the applicability of the following additional 
exceptions: Rule 63(12) {a), statement of Physical or 
Mental Condition of the Declarant; Rule 63(7) Admission 
by Parties; Rule 63(10) Declaration Against Interest; 
and Rule 63(4) (b) Contemporaneous Statements. Normally 
this Court will not consider an issue for the first time 
on appeal. In Simpson v. General Motors Corporation, 24 
Utah 2d 301, 470 P.2d 399 (1970), this Court said: 
Orderly procedure, whose 
proper purpose is the final 
settlement of controversies, requires 
that a party must present his entire 
case and his theory or theories of 
recovery to the trial court; and having 
done so, he cannot thereafter chanae 
to some different theory and thus ~ 
attempt to keep in motion a merry-go-
round of litigation. 
470 P.2d at 401. See also: State v. Treadway, 28 Utah 2d 
160, 499 P.2d 846 (1972); State v. Starlight Club, 17 Utah 
2d 174, 406 P.2d 912 (1965). 
Allowing the appellant to raise new issues on 
appeal which were not raised in the court below is not 
appropriate in this case. Here the appellant contends that 
the trial court erred in not allowing the hearsay statement 
of the appellant to come into evidence because it falls under 
one of five exceptions to the hearsay rule. In light of 
the fact that appellant directed the court to that specific 
-5-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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exception which he felt allowed the hearsay statement to 
come into evidence the appellant should not, after failing 
below on one theory be allowed to change his theory on 
appeal, and thus "keep the merry-go-round of litigation 
in motion." Simpson, supra. 
Hearsay statements are generally inadmissible 
unless they fall within one of the defined exceptions to 
the hearsay rule. By directing the court to Rule 63(6), 
the appellant was in fact attempting to define the limited 
scope of the use of the proffered statement in accordance 
with Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Evidence which provides: 
When relevant evidence is admissible as 
to one party or for one purpose and is 
inadmissible as to other parties or for 
another purpose, the judge upon request 
shall restrict the evidence to its proper 
scope and instruct the jury accordingly. 
The appellant's attempt to define an admissible 
use of an otherwise inadmissible hearsay statement failed 
and the appellant should be precluded from raising new 
theories of admissibility on appeal. 
-6-
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING 
APPELLANT'S HEARSAY STATEMENT. 
The trial court was correct in excluding the 
appellant's hearsay statement because it did not fall 
within any of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
"Hearsay statements have been generally discredited because 
they (1) lack trustworthiness and (2) the person purporting 
to know the facts is not stating them under oath." State 
In Re K.D.S., 578 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah 1978). Exceptions to 
the hearsay rule are enumerated in Rule 63 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. In this case the appellant attempted 
to introduce his exculpatory statement without taking the 
stand to avoid cross-examination by the prosecution about 
his prior convictions for burglary. The judge was correct 
in excluding the hearsay statement because it lacked 
trustworthiness and was to be introduced to keep the appellant 
from being cross-examined under oath, thus this case falls 
within the scope of statements which should be excluded 
under the authority of State In Re K.D.S., supra. 
A. 
THE APPELLANT'S HEARSAY STATEMENT WAS NOT 
ADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE 63(12) (a) AS A 
STATEMENT OF THE MENTAL CONDITION OF THE 
DECLARAN'T. 
-7-
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As stated earlier, this issue is not properly 
before this Court on appeal since it was not raised in 
the trial court. However, if this Court decides to examine 
this issue, the record below indicates that the appellant's 
hearsay statement does not fall within the statement of 
mental condition exception to the hearsay rule which 
states: 
Unless the judge finds it was made in 
bad faith, a statement of the declarant's 
(a) then existing state of mind, emotion 
or physical sensation, including statments 
of intent, plan, motive, design, mental 
feeling, pain and bodily health, but not 
including memory or belief to prove the 
fact remembered or believed, when such a 
mental or physical condition is an issue 
or is relevant to prove or explain acts 
or conduct of the declarant. 
Rule 63(12) (a), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Since this issue was not raised below the trial court was 
not given an opportunity to make a specific finding on 
whether the statement was in bad faith. On appeal this 
Court should affirm the trial court if the record discloses 
that the proper legal ground existed even if it was not 
stated by the trial court. Edwards v. Iron County, 531 P.ld 
476 (Utah 1975); Foss Lewis & Sons Const. Co. v. General 
Insurance co. of America, 30 Utah 2d 290, 517 P.2d 539 (19 731 
In examining the discussion that occurred out 
-8-
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of the presence of the jury, the record indicates that 
the judge implicitly ruled that the appellant's statement 
was in bad faith. The court characterized the attempt of 
the appellant by stating: 
(T. 42). 
~\That you are trying to do and I can 
tell you right now is, you are trying 
to get his excuse before this jury 
without putting him on the stand to 
say it and I'm not going to let you do 
it. 
The reasoning of the trial court is mirrored by the 
Washington Court of Appeals in dealing with a case similar 
to this one. In State v. Smith, 15 Wash.App. 103, 547 P.2d 
299 (1976), the defendant appealed from a conviction of 
two charges of taking a motor vehicle without the permission 
of the owner. The defendant contested the exclusion of 
hearsay testimony as to defendant's intoxicated state at 
the time of making a confession. The appellate court 
sustained the exclusion as proper and not within the state 
of physical and mental condition exception to the hearsay 
rule because: 
The statements were self serving and their 
admission would have avoided cross-examination 
at trial and circumvented the purpose of 
Cr.R. 3.5. 
547 P.2d at 302. 
-9-
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Here as there, the "self-serving characterization" is 
sufficient to establish that the statement does not come 
within the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. 
The only significant obstacle to the admission 
of state of mind declarations is that of willful 
misrepresentations which can be overcome if the court 
finds that the declaration was given under circumstances 
showing no apparent motive for the speaker to falsify. 
1977 Utah Law Review 85, 88. The judge's ruling indicates 
doubt of the lack of motive to falsify. The appellant's 
"admission" consisted of confirming the fact that he had 
been at Snowbird, a fact which could not be denied because 
appellant knew that an eyewitness could identify him, 
and an exculpatory statement which was given to the 
arresting police officer and thus lacked the verity that 
accompanies statements to independent third parties. 
The cases cited by the appellant are not deter-
minative in this case. In State v. Simmons, 573 P.2d 341 
(Utah 1977) , the statement which the defendant had attempted·. 
introduce was not similar in character to the one in this 
case because there the defendant made the statement to 
an independent third person. Here the defendant had just 
fled from the scene of the burglary and knew that an 
-10-
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eye-witness could identify him. Even if the statement 
was admissible under Rule 63(12) (a), failure to admit 
the statement would not be prejudicial error according 
to Simmons, supra. 
State v. Wauneka, 560 P.2d 1377 (Utah 1977) is 
totally inapplicable because there the statements which 
the prosecution attempted to introduce were statements of 
the victim in a homicide case which were not relevant 
because the victim's state of mind is not in question in 
a homicide case. 
The record is sufficient to establish that the 
statement was hearsay which was not made in good faith and 
thus the trial court did not commit error in excluding it 
since it did not come within Rule 63(12) (a) as an exception 
to the hearsay rule. 
B 
THE APPELLANT'S HEARSAY STATEMENT WAS NOT 
ADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE 63(6) AS A CONFESSION 
OR ADMISSION. 
The record indicates that the judge made a ruling 
which specifically determined that the hearsay statement 
which the appellant wished to introduce was not a confession 
or admission. The appellant contends that the statement 
established that the appellant was at Snowbird, but that he 
-11-
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did not possess the intent to commit burglary. Such in 
and of itself does not, as appellant claims, establish 
that appellant could be convicted of criminal trespass. 
The appellant's statement not only denies intent to commit 
theft, but also fails to suggest that appellant possessed 
the intent to commit criminal trespass (See Point III, infra 
Since the statement would not be a basis upon which the 
appellant could be convicted of criminal trespass it is 
not an admission as claimed by the appellant. 
Rule 63(6) provides: 
In a criminal proceeding as against 
the accused, a previous statement by him 
relative to the offense charged if, and 
only if, the judge finds that the state-
ment was made knowingly and voluntarily 
by the accused and the circumstances 
under which the statement was made were 
not violative of the constitutional 
rights of the accused. 
_,
The appellant conceded that the statement is n~ 
a confession (T.41) thus on appeal this Court need only 
decide whether the trial court was correct in refusing to 
sustain appellant's claim that his statement was less iliG 
a full confession and thus equal to an admission. 
The trial court characterized the statement as 
"not a proper admission or confession but an excuse for 
why he was there" (T.41). 
-12-
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(T. 44) . 
What you are trying to elicit is a 
statement, I'm sure, that says: "I admit 
I was there but I wasn't there with the 
intent of committing any crime." 
Now, that's not an admission and that's 
not against his interest. That's a self-
serving statement and it loses the char-
acter of truthfulness that the admission 
that the exception contemplates and has 
been permitted for all these hundreds of 
years. 
The reason for this exception is because 
the law says a man is not going to say 
something against his own interest unless 
it's true. 
The court found that the appellant's construction of Rule 
63(6) would "contemplate allowing anything that the accused 
says to come in regardless of whether it's an admission or 
not . ." (T.45) and ruled that that was not the proper 
construction of Rule 63(6) and thus the appellant's statement 
was not admissible because it was not an admission against 
the appellant's interest but was simply a self-serving 
exculpatory statement. 
c 
THE APPELLANT'S HEARSAY STATEMENT WAS 
NOT AD!1ISSIBLE UNDER RULE 63 ( 7) AS AN 
ADMISSIO!' BY A PARTY. 
-13-
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Respondent submits that this issue is not proper)y 
before this Court on appeal since it was not raised in t~ 
trial court. However, if this Court decides to examine this 
issue the record demonstrates that the appellant's hears~ 
statement does not fall within Rule 63(7) which provides: 
As against himself a statement by a 
person who is a party to the action in 
his individual or a representative 
capacity and, if the latter, who was 
acting in such representative capacity 
in making the statement; 
J. Maughan. concurrina in State In Re K.D.S, supra at 13 
noted that this exception only applies in civil cases. This 
matter is not a civil case and this exception is inapplicabi:. 
Even if this exception applied in criminal cases 
it is clearly not applicable to this case because it states 
that "as against himself" a statement is admissible. The 
appellant's statement is not against himself, it is s~p~ 
an exculpatory statement which does not create any basis 
upon which the appellant could be admitting to the lesser 
crime of criminal trespass. 
The cases cited by appellant, State In Re K.D.S, 
and Watters v. Querry, 588 P.2d 702 (Utah 1978) 
support the interpretation of Rule 63(7) as applying only 
to civil cases, thus the trial court did not err in excludinc 
the hearsay statement. 
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D 
THE APPELLANT'S HEARSAY STATEMENT WAS 
NOT ADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE 63 (10) AS A 
DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST. 
Again, this issue is not properly before this 
court on appeal since it was not raised in the trial court. 
However if this Court decides to examine this issue the 
record clearly indicates that the appellant's hearsay 
statement does not fall within the declaration against 
interest exception to the hearsay rule, Rule 63(10) which 
provides: 
Subject to the limitations of exception 
(6), a statement which the judge finds was 
made by a declarant who is unavailable as 
a witness and which was at the time of the 
assertion so far contrary to the declarant's 
pecuniary or proprietary interest or so far 
subjected him to civil or criminal liability 
or so far rendered invalid a claim by him 
against another or created such risk of 
making him an object of hatred, ridicule 
or social disapproval that the declarant 
under the circumstances existing would not 
have made the statement unless he believed 
it to be true; 
In order to establish that the appellant's hearsay 
statement was admissible as a declaration against interest 
the appellant must show that (1) the declarant was unavailable, 
(2) the statement was against his pecuniary or proprietary 
interest or so far subjected him to civil or criminal liability, 
and (3) the declarant would not have made the statement 
-15-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
unless it were true. The appellant cannot show that any 
of these requirements are present in this case. 
In the present case the appellant claims that 
by exercising his priviledge against self incrimination 
he was unavailable as a witness. In State v. Smith, supra, 
the defendant made a similar claim. The trial court 
rejected that claim and the appellate court affirmed 
statinq: 
Here the defendant chose not to 
testify at trial. This does not 
constitute a sufficient showing 
of unavailability to allow intro-
duction of a defendant's former 
testimony. Unavailability, for 
purposes of the hearsay exception, 
must be "without the connivance of 
the party seeking to introduce the 
testimony" of the absent witness. 
State v. Ortego, supra, 22 wash.2d 
at 564, 157 P.2d at 326. A defendant 
responsible for his own absence or 
unavailability cannot be considered 
unavailable for purposes of intro-
ducing his prior testimony. State 
v. Small, 20 N.C.App. 423, 201 S.E. 
2d 584 (1974) 
547 P.2d 299, 301. 
Although Rule 62 (7) (a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence includes 
exception of a witness on the grounds of priviledge as a 
situation constituting unavailability this Court should 
follow State v. Smith, and not allow a defendant to manipulat: 
the hearsay exceptions and connive unavailability in order 
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to avoid cross-examination about prior convictions. 
Even if the appellant is allowed to claim 
unavailability based on his priviledge against self 
incrimination he failed to establish that his statement 
was against pecuniary or proprietary interest or such as 
to subject him to civil or criminal liability. Appellant 
contends that the statement would subject him to criminal 
liability, in that it was an admission of criminal 
trespass. As noted below (See point III, infra) there 
was never any foundation whereby the appellant could be 
convicted of criminal trespass thus the statement was 
not one which would subject him to criminal liability. 
In fact, the statement, as characterized by the court 
below (T.41) was merely an "excuse" for his presence, 
which could not be denied because there was an eye 
witness. 
Finally, even if appellant had established that 
the statement was such as to subject him to criminal 
liability the circumstances under which the statement was 
made are not condusive to showing that the appellant would 
not have made the statement unless it were true. The 
appellant had been caught "red handed" in the victim's 
room and he knew that he could be identified. This 
knowledge may have prompted the appellant to state to the 
-17-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
arresting officer that he was at Snowbird, since denial 
would be useless. Apparently the appellant also stated 
that he did not intend to take anything from the apartment 
in which he was found. Such a statement lacks the credibifr 
present in statements to third parties, or those which tend 
to implicate an individual in a crime. The circumstances 
of the appellant's statement distinguish it from those 
which were intended by this exception to the hearsay rule, 
The appellant failed to demonstrate any basis 
upon which Rule 63(10) could apply to his statement and 
the trial court did not err in excluding the hearsay 
statement. 
E 
THE APPELLANT'S HEARSAY STATEMENT WAS 
NOT ADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE 63(4) (b) AS 
A CONTEMPORANEOUS STATEMENT. 
This issue is not properly before this Court on 
appeal since it was not raised in the trial court. However, 
even if this Court decides to examine this issue it is clear 
that the appellant's proffered statement does not fall 
within Rule 63 (4) (b) contemporaneous statement exception 
to the hearsay rule which states: 
A statement (a) which the judge finds was 
made while the declarant was perceiving 
the event or condition which the statement 
narrates, describes or explains, or 
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(b) which the judge finds was made 
while the declarant was under the 
stress of a nervous excitement caused 
by such perception. 
The facts of this case indicate that the statement in 
question was not made contemporaneous to the event in 
question. In this case the statement was made after the 
appellant had left the apartment, and the canyon. He was 
traveling in the valley when he was apprehended by the 
police officer. 
State v. McMillan, 588 P.2d 162 (Utah 1978) 
cited by the appellant estab1ishes that this statement 
was not within the contemporaneous statement exception, 
quoting Johnston v. Ohls, 76 Wash.2d 398, 457 P.2d 194 
(1969), this Court described the nature of this exception 
to the hearsay rule: 
The crucial question in all cases is 
whether the statement was made while 
the declarant was still under the 
influence of the event to the extent 
that his statement could not be the 
result of fabrication, intervening 
actions, or the exercise of choice or 
judgment. 
State v. McMillan, supra, at 163. 
In McMillan the Court found that the statement by 
a child, made minutes after the event had occurred would 
not be subject to fabrication. In this case the appellant, 
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who was not a child, was able to reflect upon the 
situation from the time he ran from Richard Ball's room 
at Snowbird until he reached the Salt Lake Valley where 
he was arrested. 
This case clearly falls within State v. Sanders, 
27 Utah 2d 354, 496 P.2d 270 (1972) where the Court fou~ 
that the nervous excitement necessary to establish this 
exception to the hearsay rule was not present where the 
co-defendant made a statement implicating himself and 
three others after the commission of the robbery. There 
as here the act of which the appellant was charged had 
been completed. 
If the appellant was under any nervous stress 
it was that which accompanied his arrest and not that which 
could be associated to the "burglary." Therefore the 
appellant's statement did not fall within the conternpor~~m 
statement exception and the trial court did not err in 
excluding it. 
F 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING 
APPELLANT'S HEARSAY STATEMENT, AND EVEN 
IF ERROR OCCURRED IT WAS HARMLESS. 
Respondent submits that only Rule 63 (6) is properl 
before this Court on appeal because the appellant failed 
to timely raise other exceptions to the hearsay rule in t~ 
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court below. However, as shown in A through E above, the 
appellant's statement was not admissible under any of the 
hearsay exceptions and the trial court was correct in 
excluding the evidence. 
Assur.1ing arguendo, that the evidence was admissible 
under any one of the hearsay exceptions noted by the appellant 
failure to admit that evidence was not prejudicial. In order 
to reverse a verdict based on the erroneous exclusion of 
evidence two things must be shown, as described in Rule 
5 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: 
A verdict or finding shall not be set 
aside, nor shall the judgment or decision 
based thereon be reversed, by reason of the 
erroneous exclusion of evidence unless (a) 
it appears of record that the proponent of 
the evidence either made known the substance 
of the evidence in a form and by a method 
approved by the judge, or indicated the sub-
stance of the expected evidence by questions 
indicating the desired answers, and (b) the 
court which passes upon the effect of the 
error or errors is of the opinion that the 
excluded evidence would probably have had a 
substantial influence in bringing about a 
different verdict or finding. 
In State v. Simmons, supra, upon finding that the 
excluded hearsay statement was admissible this Court stated 
that: 
We must review alleged error in con-
formity with 77-42-1, U.C.A.1953, ~nd 
may not interfere with a jury verdict, 
unless upon review of the entire record, 
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there emerges error of sufficient 
gravity to indicate defendant's 
rights were prejudiced, in a sub-
stantial manner. There must be a 
reasonable probability there would 
have been a result more favorable 
to defendant, in the absence of 
error. 
The alleged error in this case is not of sufficient 
gravity to indicate that defendant's rights were prejudic~. 
In view of the fact that the statement would have been 
admitted had the appellant wished to take the stand the 
trial court did not substantially impair appellants rights 
by excluding the statement. In addition there must be a 
reasonable probability that there would have been a result 
more favorable to the defendant, as discussed below (See 
Point III, infra) the appellant could not establish intent 
to merely commit criminal trespass, based on the evidence 
he was either guilty of burglary or not guilty at all. 
Thus, there is not a reasonable probability that the 
verdict would have been different and this Court should 
not reverse appellant's conviction. 
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POINT III 
CRIMINAL TRESPASS IS NOT A NECESSARILY 
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF BURGLARY AND 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO INSTRUCT ON CRIMINAL TRESPASS. 
Appellant contends that criminal trespass, Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-206 (1953, as amended), is a necessarily 
included offense of burglary, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201 
(1953, as amended), and because he requested an instruction 
on the lesser crime the trial court's refusal to so instruct 
constitutes reversible error. 
Both the premise and conclusion of appellant's 
contention are erroneous and do not compel reversal of 
the jury verdict. Under the facts of this case and the 
law regarding the giving of requested instructions the 
trial court ruled oroperlv and no reversible error occurred. 
A 
THE DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE 
HAS A RIGHT TO SUBMIT HIS THEORY 
OF THE CASE TO THE JURY IN THE 
INSTRUCTIONS ONLY UNDER PROPER 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Respondent does not dispute the basic premise 
that a defendant in a criminal case should be allowed to 
present his theory of the case to the jury. However, in 
State v. Hendricks, 596 P.2d 633 (Utah 1979), this Court 
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recognized that "the right is not absolute, and a defense 
theory must be supported by a certain quantum of evidence 
before an instruction as to an included offense need be 
given." Because the right is not unlimited the trial 
court is not necessarily bound to give all instructions 
relating to defense theories just because they are 
requested or because they are characterized by the defendant 
as reflecting his theory of the case. 
Therefore, if a defendant's theory of the case is 
all theory and no evidence or so unreasonable based on the 
evidence presented that it does not satisfy the requirements 
of a defense, no instruction thereon is required. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-201, et seq. (1953), as amended. 
In support of his claim that a defendant's theory 
of the case must be instructed upon, appellant cites 
State v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 374, 463 P.2d 811 (1970), fur 
the proposition that "when the accused as his theory of the 
case requests instructions on lesser included offenses · · 
the trial court as a general rule is duty bound to submit 
these alternatives to the trier of the fact" {appellant's 
brief, p.22). 
The appellant admits that this general rule is 
limited to situations where the defendant's argument is 
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that he is not guilty of the crime as charged and he is 
guilty of some lesser charge. A situation which does not 
factually exist in the present case (See IIIC below) • 
Gillian was a first degree murder trial where substantial 
evidence of criminal homicide other than first degree 
murder was presented and this Court found that the trial 
court's failure to so instruct was reversible error. 
Gillian does not mean that any defense theory is a basis 
for a requested instruction on lesser offenses. The theory 
must be based on reasonable (even substantial) evidence 
before an instruction on a lesser included offense is 
mandated. 
The lesson of Gillian is that on review this Court 
must look at the facts of the case to determine the validity 
of the trial court's rejection of proposed instructions. 
Because a defendant characterizes certain evidence as a 
defense theory and requests instructions thereon, does not 
mean that the trial court, or a reviewing court, must adopt 
that characterization when the evidence presents a theory 
different than that which the defendant propounds. In this 
case the evidence presented does not support the defendant's 
theory of criminal trespass and the trial court was correct 
in refusing to instruct thereon. 
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B 
CRIMINAL TRESPASS IS NOT NECESSARILY 
A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF BURGLARY. 
In State v. Hendricks, 596 P.2d 633 (Utah 1979), 
this Court examined the question of whether criminal 
trespass is a lesser included offense of burglary and found 
that it is not. In that case the defendant charged with 
burglary raised the defense of voluntary intoxication and 
requested an instruction on criminal trespass which was 
denied. On appeal this Court sustained the trial court's 
refusal to give the instruction on criminal trespass bec~H 
"the evidence (including that presented by the defendant), 
established all of the elements of burglary but did not 
establish all of the elements of criminal trespass." Id. at 
634. Contrary to the appellant's assertion, this holding 
indicates that this Court found that criminal trespass is 
not necessarily a lesser included offense of burglary. The 
meaning is clear when footnote 6 which follows this Statement 
is analyzed. In that footnote the Court states that, "Such 
in and of itself precludes the giving of the requested 
instructions. As to what constitutes an included offense 
see: State v. Woolman, 84 Utah 23, 33 P. 2d 640 (1934)' and 
State v. Brennan, 13 Utah 2d 195, 371 P.2d 27 (1962)." 
The standards under which the Court determined that 
·de· 
the instruction on criminal trespass was precluded provi · 
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The statute allows conviction for 
~ny lesser offense necessarily included 
in the offense charged in the indictment or 
information, but does not allow conviction 
of any lesser offense stated in the indictment 
unless it is necessarily included in the 
greater offense. The lesser offense must be 
a necessary element of the greater offense and 
must of necessity be embraced within the legal 
definition of the greter offense and be a 
part thereof. 
33 P.2d at 645 (emphasis by Court, added). 
The rule as to when one offense 
is included in another is that the greater 
offense includes a lesser one when establish-
ment of the greater would necessarily include 
proof of all the elements necessary to prove 
the lesser. Conversely, it is only when the 
proof of the lesse·r offense requires some 
element not involved in the greater offense 
that the lesser would not be an included 
offense. 
371 P.2d at 29 (emphasis added). 
Since the evidence established all the elements of 
burglary but did not establish all the elements of criminal 
trespass it is clear that "the lesser offense requires some 
element not involved in the greater offense" and thus criminal 
trespass is not a lesser included offense of burglary. 
This conclusion was not reversed in the recent case 
of State v. Brooks, P.2d , Sup. Ct. No. 16729, May 
28, 1981 (Utah), where this Court affirmed the trial court's 
refusal to grant defendant's motion to reduce the charge from 
burglary to criminal trespass. In that case this Court's 
discussion of the issue centered on the proof of the 
defendant's intent to commit a theft because as a matter of 
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of law the trial court would not have been correct if t~ 
evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for 
burglary. This Court ultimately decided that there was 
enough evidence to submit the question to the jury. In 
Brooks, this Court did not state that criminal trespass 
is a lesser included offense of burglary and thus followed 
the holding of Hendricks, supra, which remains the law. 
A comparison of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-202, 
burglary, and 76-6-206, criminal trespass, confirms that 
criminal trespass requires proof of elements not involved 
in burglary. Therefore under the test of Woolman and 
Brennan, supra, criminal trespass is not a necessarily 
lesser included offense of burglary. Section 76-6-202 provL 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if 
he enters or remains unlawfully in a building 
or any portion of a building with intent to 
commit a felony or theft or commit an assault 
on any person. 
(2) Burlgary is a felony of the third 
degree unless it was committed in a dwelling, 
in which event it is a felony of the second 
degree. 
Section 76-6-206 provides: 
( 1) For purposes of ht is section 'enter' 
means intrusion of the entire body. 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal 
trespass if, under circumstances not . 
amounting to burglary as defined in sections 
76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204: 
(a) He enters or remains unlawfully on 
property and: · · ry (i) Intends to cause annoyance or inJU 
to any person thereon or damage to any property 
thereon; or 
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(ii) Intends to commit any crime, 
other than theft or a felony; 
(iii) Is reckless as to whether his 
presence will cause fear for the safety 
of another. 
(b) Knowing his entry or presence 
is unlaw~ul, he.enters.or remains on property 
as to which notice against entering is given 
by: 
(i) Personal communication to the 
actor by the owner or someone with apparent 
authority to act for the owner; or 
(ii) Fencing or other enclosure obviously 
designed to exclude intruders; or 
(iii) Posting of signs reasonably likely 
to come to the attention of the intruders. 
(3) A violation of subsection (2) (a) 
is a class C misdemeanor unless it was committed 
in a dwelling, in which event it is a class B 
misdemeanor. A violation of subsection (2) (b) 
is an infraction. 
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under 
this section: 
(a) That the property was open to the 
public when the actor entered or remained; and 
(b) The actor's conduct did not 
substantially interfere with the owner's use 
of the property. 
To prove criminal trespass, a class C misdemeanor, 
the state must show that the actor entered or remained on 
property and had specific intent to do certain things or be 
reckless about the effect of his presence. 
To prove criminal trespass, an infraction, the 
state must show that the actor knowing his entry or presence 
was unlawful, entered or remained on property despite 
certain kinds of notice being given. 
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Burglary requires unlawful entry in a building 
with the intent to conunit a felony, theft or assault. 
To prove criminal trespass, a class C misdemeanor, 
requires showing specific intent different than the intent 
to conunit theft, assault or other felony, Brennan, Id. 
The elements of specific intent required for criminal 
trespass, a class C misdemeanor, are not necessary elements 
of burglary, Woolman, supra. Proof of the elements of 
burlgary does not "necessarily include proof of all the 
elements necessary to prove the lesser" crime of criminal 
trespass, Brennan, supra, and therefore no instruction 
thereon was mandated. 
Criminal trespass, an infraction, is likewise 
not necessarily established by proof of burglary. It 
requires certain kinds of notice against entry before its 
sanctions apply. 
In conclusion, the cases cited by appellant W 
support his theory that criminal trespass in Utah is a lesser 
included offense of burglary, Day v. State, Tex. Cr., 532 
S.W.2d 302 (1976); People v. Henderson, 41 N.Y.2d 233, 359 
N.E. 2d 1357 (1976); and Commonwealth v. Carter, 344 A.2d 89~ 
(Pa. 1975), are distinguishable. 
In Day v. State, supra, the criminal trespass 
statute is significantly different than our statute. The 
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Texas statute does not contain any of the specific intent 
provisions of Section 76-6-206(2) (a). The better view of 
subsection (2) (b), is that notice against entry must be 
more than a building itself and the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals incorrectly construed that element of criminal 
trespass. Moreover, the test for giving lesser included 
instructions is less rigorous in Texas than in Utah and an 
instruction thereon in Texas may have been obligatory. 
The criminal trespass statute in People v. 
Henderson, supra, is also dissimilar to Utah's statute. 
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Ann., Book 39, 
§§ 140.05, 140.10, reveal that no specific intent element 
exists in the New York statute. New York has eliminated 
the word "obviously" from its approximate analog of 
Section 76-6-206(2) (b) and does not include an explicit 
notice requirement as exists in Utah's statute. 
Commonwealth v. Carter, supra, indicates that 
Pennsylvania's criminal trespass statute proscribes only 
unlicensed or unprivileged entry into a building or occupied 
structure. 344 A.2d 901. Thus, the elements of intent 
present in Section 76-6-206(2) (a) and the element of notice 
present in Section 76-6-206(2) (b) are absent from the 
Pennsylvania statute. Furthermore, the Pennsylvania statute 
is limited to buildings and structures, a more narrow term 
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than the broad "property" language of Section 76-6-206. 
For the reasons cited above it is clear that er~ 
trespass is not a lesser included offense of burglary and t' 
trial court was correct in refusing to grant the appellant', 
requested instruction on criminal trespass. 
c 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED 
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON CRIMINAL 
TRESPASS. 
Respondent submits that State v. Hendricks, 596 
P.2d 633 (Utah 1979), has determined that criminal trespass 
is not a lesser included offense of burglary and therefore 
the trial judge was correct in refusing to give an instruct· 
on criminal trespass. However, if this Court now determines 
that criminal trespass is a lesser included offense of 
burglary, an instruction thereon was not required by the la• 
in Utah,concerning instructions on lesser offenses, on t~ 
facts of this case. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-33-6 (1953), as amended, whid 
appellant cites as imposing on the court an obligation to 
give an instruction on the lesser included offense, reads: 
The jury may find the defendant guilty 
of any offense the corrunission of which is 
necessarily included in that wit~ which ~e 
is charged in the indictment or information, 
or of an attempt to corrunit the offense. 
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According to State v. Bender, 581 P.2d 1019, 1020 (Utah 
1978). This section is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-402 (4) (1953), as amended, under which: 
The court shall not be obligated 
to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a 
rational basis for a verdict acquitting 
the defendant of the offense charged and 
convicting him of the included offense:-
(Emphasis added.) 
This statute codifies common law principles dating back to 
territorial days, People v. Robinson, 6 Utah 101, 21 P.2d 
403 (1889). 
In State v. Dougherty, 550 P.2d 175 (Utah 1976), 
the defendant was convicted of the crime of unlawful 
distribution for value of a controlled substance. He 
appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in refusing 
to give an instruction on the lesser included offense of 
possession of a controlled substance. In affirming the 
conviction, this Honorable Court held that where defense 
testimony could prove only complete innocence, the defendant 
was not entitled to an instruction on the lesser included 
offense. This Court, citing Lisby v. State, 83 Nev. 183, 414 
P.2d 592 (1966), also enunciated the three situations in 
which the question of whether to instruct on lesser included 
offenses are frequently encountered: 
-33-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.. First, where there is evidence 
which would absolve the defendant from 
guilt of a greater offense, or degree, 
but would support a finding of guilt of 
a--Iesser offense, or degree; the instruc-
tion is mandatory. 
Second, where the evidence would not 
support a finding of guilt in the commission 
of the lesser offense or degree. For 
example, the defendant denies any complicity 
in the crime charged, and thus lays no 
foundation for any intermediate verdict, or 
where the elements of the offense differ, 
and some element essential to the lesser 
offense is either not proved or shown not 
to exist. This second situation renders an 
instruction on a lesser included offense 
erroneous, because it is ~~t pertinent. 
Third, is an intermediate situation. 
One where the elements of the greater offense 
include all the elements of the lesser offense; 
because, by its very nature, the greater 
offense could not have been committed without 
defendant having the intent in doing the acts, 
which constitute the lesser offense. In such 
a situation instructions on the lesser includ~ 
offense may be given because all elements of the 
lesser offense have been proved. Ho;:c·Jer, such 
an instruction may properly be refUS"E~ if the 
prosecution has met its burden of proof of t~ 
greater offense, and there is no evidence 
tending to reduce the greater offense. 
550 P.2d at 176, 177 (emphasis added). This was affirm~~ 
State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1355 (Utah 1977), and~ 
v. Bell, 563 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah 1977). 
In the present case, the evidence presented by 
the appellant falls under the second situation cited above, 
in which an instruction on a lesser included offense is not 
appropriate at all. The defendant failed to establish ~~ 
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any basis for a conviction of criminal trespass existed. 
Appellant's characterization of his theory as justifying an 
instruction on criminal trespass misrepresents his own 
evidence. His statements as to "looking for a way out" and 
"being a guest upstairs" if believed would have eliminated 
all criminal intent and there would have been no basis for 
a conviction on criminal trespass. As noted above, criminal 
trespass, a class C misdemeanor, requires specific intent 
to do certain things or be reckless about the effect of 
his presence. The appellant failed to show that his actions 
could be the basis of a class C misdemeanor conviction. 
Similarly, the appellant's theory also eliminates intent 
to commit criminal trespass, an infraction, which requires 
some showing that the actor knowing his entry or presence was 
unlawful, entered or remained on property despite certain 
kinds of notice being given. If as the appellant characterizes 
the evidence the screen was cut open by someone besides the 
appellant the type of notice which is required to be given 
under criminal trespass an infraction would not have existed. 
Thus, "some element essential to the lesser offenses is 
either not proved or shown not to exist." Dougherty, supra, 
at 176, and the trial court was correct in refusing to give the 
requested instruction on criminal trespass. 
The facts suggest that appellant was either guilty 
of burglary or not guilty of any crime. Even if the appellant's 
version of the story was in fact the case and the jury was 
so inclined to believe his version, then no conviction could 
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stand either for the greater offense of burglary or for fr 
"alleged" le s · 1 d d ff s er inc u e o ense of criminal trespass. 
Thus, the case falls directly under the guidelines of 
State v. Dougherty, supra, where the Court declared, "The 
defense testimony could only prove complete innocence. 11 
There, as here, the appellant tried to proceed on a 
lesser included offense theory which was rejected by this 
Court: 
. . Such a theory is not 
available to him where the record 
shows he could only be found guilty 
or not guilty of the crime charged. 
550 P.2d at 177. 
It can be said, therefore, that under Utah C~e 
Ann. § 76-1-402 (4) (1953), as amended, the trial court in 
the case at bar was not obliged to instruct as to an 
included offense, because even though the jury may have 
chosen to believe the appellant, thereby acquitting him, 
no evidentiary basis existed upon which a conviction of 
criminal trespass could stand. Since Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-402(4) is stated in the conjunctive, both statutory 
requisites must be present before the trial court would be 
required to instruct on the included offense. 
The appellant also claims that this case is 
similar to other cases in which the charge of burglary 
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has been reduced to criminal trespass. The cases cited 
by appellant to support this proposition, Crawford v. state, 
241 N.E.2d 795 (Ind. 1968); State v. Rood, 11 Ariz.App. 
102, 462 P.2d 399 (1969), and State v. Kahinu, 53 Haw. 646, 
500 P.2d 747 (1972), are factually distinguishable and support 
the proposition that felonious intent in a burglary case 
may be established by circumstantial evidence. 
In Crawford v. State, supra, there was no evidence 
that any property within the garage, where the defendant was 
found hiding, had been removed in any way. In addition there 
were several broken windows through which the appellant could 
have entered without using force. Under these facts,. the 
Court determined that the evidence was insufficient to support 
a conviction of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, it 
was insufficiency of the evidence and not the use of 
circumstantial evidence which precluded the conviction. 
In fact, the Court stated that, "We agree with the appellee 
[state) . . . that intent may be established by inference from 
the circumstances surrounding an act." Id. at 797. 
In State v. Rood, supra, the facts of the case again 
indicated that there was an unforceable entry into an unlocked 
building. Although this was insufficient to establish felonious 
intent the court stated that, "The Arizona Supreme Court has 
held that proof of intent can be shown by circumstantial 
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evidence," Id. at 400, and "Criminal intent is usually 
proven by circumstantial evidence." Id. at 401. 
Similarly in State v. Kanihu, supra, there was 
evidence which tended to show that the room which the 
appellant entered was unlocked. Further evidence showed 
that the room was previously occupied by the appellant's 
girlfriend. Finally,the appellant's flight from the rooo 
was justified by evidence which showed that the appellant 
was suffering from paranoia as a result of L.S.D. All of 
these factors led the court to find that the appellant d~: 
possess the requisite intent to commit burglary. However, 
the court recognized that: 
Intent in a burglary case can be 
established by inference from the 
surrounding circumstances and accompanying 
and attendant acts of the person accused. 
Id. at 749. 
The present case is clearly distinguishable from 
Crawford, Rood, and Kanihu because the evidence upon which 
the jury convicted the defendant, albeit circumstantial, wa' 
sufficient to establish his intent. Here, the appellant wa' 
found in Richard Ball's apartment without authorization to~ 
there (T.11, 19). Entry was forcible through an "L" shaped 
hole in the screen which was intact when the victim had lef: 
17) Al l doors toRi: his apartment two hours earlier (T.12, · 
Ball's apartment were locked when he left at 10:10 a.m. and 
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is the only one who possessed a key (T.17,18). A "security 
box" which had a hidden lock had been moved from its 
normal resting place to the center of the victims bed with 
the lock exposed (T.18,19). The appellant jogged up a 
narrow trail and then broke into a run as he reached the 
parking lot, this was after Mr. Ball had attempted to verify 
the appellant's story (T.12,13,14). This evidence was 
sufficient to establish that the appellant possessed the 
intent to commit a theft when he entered the apartment of 
Mr. Richard Ball, and also to distinguish this case from 
State v. Brooks, supra. As noted above circumstantial 
evidence may be used to establish intent. In State v. Burch, 
17 Utah 2d 418, 413 P.2d 805 (1966), this Court affirmed a 
second degree burglary conviction stating that circumstantial 
evidence showing that the defendant was caught "red handed" 
was sufficient to establish the defendant's intent. 
Similarly, the circumstantial evidence which tended to show 
that Richard Ball's security box had been tampered with while 
the defendant was unlawfully located in Mr. Ball's apartment 
was sufficient to establish felonious intent. State v. Dusch, 
17 Ariz.App. 286, 497 P.2d 402 (1972), states that felonious 
intent can be inferred from unauthorized entry into a 
building through a window. 
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Appellant's attempt to create a defense theory 
showing the necessary elements of criminal trespass does 
not compel reversal. 
In compliance with the facts here and State v. 
Cornish, Utah, 568 P. 2d 360 (1977), the trial court proper!: 
allowed the trier of fact to consider appellant's intent. 
The jury could have believed the defendant and found no 
intent to commit any crime and acquitted appellant, or the,, 
j 
could have believed the evidence presented by the sta~ ~ 
found the existence of the requisite conduct and inte~ ~ 
convicted appellant of burglary. 
Appellant's conviction was valid and the trial 
court correctly refused to give instructions on criminal 
trespass. 
CONCLUSION 
It is a well established principle of law that an 
appellate court will not review those issues which were not 
timely raised in the trial court. In this case appellant 
has attempted to raise hearsay exceptions on appeal whi~ 
were not timely raised below. Appellant should be preclude: 
from raising any exception to the hearsay rule which was no: 
timely raised in the trial court. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the hearsay exceptions 
which the appellant submits are reviewable on appeal they 
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do not apply to facts of this case and the trial court was 
correct in excluding the self-serving hearsay statement of 
the appellant. 
Finally, the appellant's proffered instruction on 
criminal trespass was properly rejected by the trial court 
because in State v. Hendricks, supra, this Court determined 
that criminal trespass is not a lesser included offense 
of burglary. Assuming arguendo,that criminal trespass was 
a lesser included offense the facts of this case do not 
require that the instruction be given since there is not a 
basis upon which the appellant could be acquitted of the 
greater crime and convicted of the lesser crime. Under 
appellant's theory of the case he was either guilty of 
burglary or not guilty of any crime. 
Appellant's conviction should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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